EDISON VIEW
AI is best understood as a value chain rather than a single asset class. As of June 2026, the most durable value has accrued upstream, to the infrastructure build-out and the picks and shovels behind every data centre, while much application software is already priced for AI growth. With valuations in parts of the market echoing past cycles, the question is less whether AI delivers than where in the chain value is created, and who captures it.
AI is best analysed as a value chain rather than a single asset class. Few companies are purely AI-native, while many are embedding AI into existing products, services and operations. Edison maps AI exposure across seven layers: equipment manufacturers, semiconductors and components, data centre infrastructure, cloud platforms, foundation models, application software and end-users adopting AI. As of June 2026, much of the value created by AI has accrued to companies exposed to the infrastructure build-out, particularly in the lower layers of the stack. Meanwhile, many application software companies have already been rerated on expectations of future AI-driven growth. However, the longer term distribution of value across the AI ecosystem is likely to prove far more nuanced, with winners and losers emerging at every layer of the value chain.
Both can be true at once: AI is creating genuine economic value while parts of the
market exhibit bubble-like characteristics. Every major technology cycle has been
accompanied by periods of excessive optimism and speculative behaviour. AI may prove
to be the most significant technology cycle yet, given the speed, scale and breadth
of the transformation it is driving across industries and business models.
History suggests that such cycles create substantial winners but also many losers,
as early expectations are tested against commercial reality. Edison noted in October
2025 that some valuation measures were approaching levels last seen during the dot-com era, with the cyclically adjusted price-to-earnings (CAPE) ratio near 39.6x, compared
with a peak of around 44x in 2000 and a long-run average of roughly 17x. However,
the comparison is imperfect. Today's leading AI companies generate substantial revenues,
cash flows and profits, whereas many of the most highly valued technology companies
in 2000 had yet to establish sustainable business models.
At the same time, we are beginning to see increasingly broad-based valuation expansion
across companies with varying degrees of AI exposure. Such indiscriminate rerating
has often been a feature of the later stages of previous technology booms and can
be a warning sign that expectations are running ahead of fundamentals. That does not
necessarily imply that AI itself is a bubble; rather, it suggests that parts of the
market may be vulnerable to correction if growth, adoption or returns on investment
fail to meet expectations. The key indicators to watch are the pace of AI-related
revenue growth, evidence of commercial adoption and the ability of companies to convert
AI investment into sustainable earnings growth.
The answer depends heavily on where a company sits within the AI value chain. The
question of defensibility is most relevant at the application software layer and above,
where access to foundation models is increasingly commoditised. Here, we look for
differentiated and proprietary datasets, specialist domain expertise and deep integration
into customer workflows. In many cases, the competitive advantage comes not from the
AI itself but from the ability to apply it within a specific industry context that
is difficult to replicate. Companies that span an entire industry or workflow often
enjoy a further advantage, as they can aggregate data, insights and best practice
across a broader customer base than any single organisation can achieve independently.
Distribution, customer relationships, regulatory expertise and switching costs can
be equally important sources of competitive advantage. Indeed, as foundation models become more widely available, ownership of the customer
relationship may prove more valuable than ownership of the model itself. The companies
most likely to capture long-term value are those that control the point of engagement
with the customer, understand their workflows and can embed AI seamlessly into existing
processes.
Ultimately, the immediate risk for many SaaS companies is not that they will be replaced
by AI, but that AI reduces the value of adjacent features and limits their ability
to capture incremental growth opportunities. The most defensible businesses are therefore
those that use AI to strengthen existing moats, creating products that improve with
usage and become increasingly embedded within customer workflows over time.
AI infrastructure companies should be valued less on their exposure to AI and more
on their ability to convert AI-driven demand into sustainable returns on capital.
Unlike application software businesses, their economics are determined by physical
capacity, utilisation rates, pricing power, contract quality, power availability and
capital intensity. The most attractive opportunities tend to be companies that occupy
bottleneck positions within the value chain, whether through access to scarce technologies,
critical components, power infrastructure or specialised data-centre capacity. In
these cases, the key question is not how quickly AI demand grows, but how much of
that demand can be captured as durable cash flow and attractive returns on invested
capital.
Investors should also distinguish between temporary beneficiaries of the current AI
infrastructure build-out and businesses with long-term competitive advantages. Many
companies are currently benefiting from supply shortages, strong order books and elevated margins, but these conditions may not persist as capacity expands. As a result, factors such
as the duration of customer contracts, exposure to recurring inference demand rather
than one-off training expenditure, customer concentration and barriers to entry become
increasingly important. Ultimately, the best AI infrastructure investments are likely
to be those that can continue deploying capital at attractive returns long after the
initial AI investment cycle has matured.
Power, not chips, is becoming the binding constraint on AI growth. AI workloads draw far more electricity than conventional computing, and a modern AI data centre can run racks above 100kW, so continuous power has become the scarcest input. Edison notes grid connection lead times now exceed three years in several European markets, pushing hyperscalers to contract their own supply. That is why Microsoft, Google and Amazon have signed nuclear agreements and why small modular reactors are advancing, with a pipeline Wood Mackenzie sizes at roughly 22GW and $176bn of investment. For investors, the constraint means AI demand does not convert automatically into returns; capex, financing and power access gate the economics.
Determining whether AI revenue is real, repeatable and defensible is becoming increasingly
challenging because relatively few companies explicitly disclose AI revenues outside
infrastructure, semiconductors and other components of the AI supply chain. In many
cases, AI-related revenues are embedded within broader software, cloud or services
businesses, making it difficult to assess their true scale and growth. Investors therefore
need to look beyond management commentary and focus on evidence that customers are
paying specifically for AI-enabled capabilities and that those deployments are expanding
from pilots into production environments.
The challenge is particularly acute higher up the AI value chain, where AI-native
companies and start-ups can deliver exceptionally rapid revenue growth but with less
certainty around long-term durability. In some respects, this is the opposite of the
traditional SaaS model, where growth may be slower but is often supported by recurring
subscription revenues, predictable renewal patterns and high switching costs. Investors
should therefore assess not only the pace of growth but also its quality, focusing
on customer retention, recurring revenue mix, usage trends and the extent to which
revenue growth is supported by contracted deployments rather than experimentation.
A further consideration is how much of a company's value derives from its own intellectual
property, proprietary data and customer relationships versus the foundation models
and platforms on which it depends. As access to leading AI models becomes increasingly
commoditised, the most defensible revenues are likely to accrue to companies that
own unique datasets, specialist workflows, industry expertise or direct customer relationships
rather than simply acting as intermediaries on top of third-party AI platforms. Ultimately,
the strongest evidence that AI revenue is real is not product announcements or demonstrations,
but customers that continue to expand their spending, renew contracts and integrate
the technology into core business processes over time.
Edison groups the principal risks of investing in AI into seven broad categories. First, valuation risk, where share prices already discount rapid and sustained growth, leaving little margin for disappointment. Second, execution risk, as companies may struggle to translate technological capability into widespread adoption, sustainable revenues and attractive returns. Third, infrastructure risk, where power availability, grid constraints, semiconductor supply chains, compute costs or dependence on third-party models can delay growth and reduce profitability. Fourth, concentration and circular financing risk, where spending is heavily reliant on a small number of hyperscalers, enterprise customers or strategic partners, and where demand and funding cluster among a few large players. Fifth, competitive and disruption risk, reflecting the pace of innovation, the emergence of open-source alternatives and the potential commoditisation of AI capabilities, which can rapidly erode competitive advantages. Sixth, regulatory and legal risk, as governments continue to develop frameworks around data ownership, intellectual property, privacy, liability and AI safety. Seventh, information risk, including the spread of AI-generated misinformation, or AI slop, which can distort sentiment and raises the bar on source verification.
Investors should also recognise that AI is unusual in that technological progress itself can be a source of risk. Improvements in model efficiency, changes in industry architecture or shifts in where value accrues can benefit AI adoption overall while reducing returns for individual companies. As a result, being correct about the long-term growth of AI does not necessarily mean being correct about which companies will ultimately capture the economic value. These risks also compound during periods of valuation stress, when concentration and financing linkages tend to matter most.
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