OnTheMarket (OTM) has listed on AIM, raising £30m to build market share in the UK online property portal space. Founded as a mutual by estate agents, it is more closely aligned to their interests than the two main incumbents. The monies raised will be invested in sales and in IT, as well as funding a major marketing campaign to grow the agency network and increase brand awareness. This will push the group into loss for FY19 and FY20, with profits modelled from FY21 on. Backed by long-term agent contracts, OTM has high levels of recurring income on a scalable platform.
OnTheMarket |
First day OnTheMarket |
First day of dealings/initiation |
Media |
9 February 2018 |
Business description
Next events
Analysts
OnTheMarket is a research client of Edison Investment Research Limited |
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OnTheMarket (OTM) has listed on AIM, raising £30m to build market share in the UK online property portal space. Founded as a mutual by estate agents, it is more closely aligned to their interests than the two main incumbents. The monies raised will be invested in sales and in IT, as well as funding a major marketing campaign to grow the agency network and increase brand awareness. This will push the group into loss for FY19 and FY20, with profits modelled from FY21 on. Backed by long-term agent contracts, OTM has high levels of recurring income on a scalable platform.
Year end |
Revenue (£m) |
PBT* |
EPS* |
DPS |
P/E |
EV/sales |
01/16 |
17.9 |
(3.1) |
(8.8) |
0.0 |
N/A |
4.0 |
01/17 |
17.8 |
1.0 |
2.7 |
0.0 |
61.1 |
4.0 |
01/18e |
16.0 |
2.2 |
6.2 |
0.0 |
26.1 |
4.4 |
01/19e |
18.0 |
(21.4) |
(35.3) |
0.0 |
N/A |
3.9 |
01/20e |
35.0 |
(12.6) |
(16.7) |
0.0 |
N/A |
2.0 |
Note: *PBT and EPS are normalised, excluding amortisation of acquired intangibles, exceptional items and share-based payments.
Going for share
The UK online property market is dominated by two portals, Rightmove and ZPG/ Zoopla, the former being clear market leader. While they generate high levels of traffic, prices charged to participating agencies have risen, with no respite in sight prior to OTM’s arrival. OTM was set up as Agents’ Mutual as an alternative, to provide a positive search experience for consumers, while acting in the interests of agents. Around 20% of participating agents’ total inventory is placed exclusively on the OTM portal for a limited initial period. The flotation raised £30m gross to scale the business, step up agent recruitment and drive traffic. OTM can issue equity to attract key agents to the network on long-term contracts (not possible to model in advance), with others being attracted in with discounted or free listings.
Targeting profitability in FY21
It would be possible to deliver profits at an earlier stage by turning down the marketing tap, but that would not be in the interests of building a sustainable business. Our model indicates average revenue per partner agency (ARPA) bottoming out in the current financial year to January 2019 as new agencies are brought on board, then rising towards the level achieved by Zoopla, which is less than half that charged by Rightmove.
Valuation: Dependent on modelling of discounts
The valuation is highly dependent on the modelling of listing fee discounting and how successful it is in adding to the network. With forecast EBITDA and PBT losses (although profits at EBIT level, pre-marketing), traditional valuation metrics are unhelpful. At the 165p issue price, OnTheMarket trades at 3.9x forecast EV/revenue to January 2019, compared with Rightmove at 16.1x and ZPG at 5.2x current year published revenue (10.4x average for a broader global peer set). We have also modelled the DCF, based on a WACC of 10.2%. This derives a value of 323p per share, but, given the potential variability of outcomes, we would suggest an execution risk discount of 30% would be appropriate, indicating a price of 226p.
Company description: Online property portal
OnTheMarket represents the web presence of a group of UK estate agents, trading as Agents’ Mutual. It was set up in January 2013 by a small group of agents to provide an alternative route to market, and a more attractive commercial proposition, to the large portal providers, in particular Rightmove and Zoopla. It was felt by the agents that these two firms were taking advantage of their strong market positioning in internet portals to their detriment as suppliers of the inventory. The original plans drawn up in March 2014 were for the portal to carry the content from 1,500 branches, rising to 6,500 by the end of year five of the business plan. When OnTheMarket launched in January 2015, it had 4,600 branches, which had risen to 6,000 two years later.
The Agents’ Mutual proposition was for a portal that was controlled by agents themselves and that would provide an enhanced user experience to consumers searching for property while charging fair prices to agents. This concept was generally well received, particularly by a broad segment of leading UK independent and group agents, which funded the venture through loan note subscriptions and committed to listing properties with the portal once it went live on five-year contracts. These loan notes converted to equity on flotation, leaving the group in a pro-forma net cash position. There is no sell down by existing shareholders. Post listing, there will be a free float of 41%, of which agent shareholders will hold 11%. The prospectus indicates that, on admission, agents will own more than 70% of the enlarged share capital.
Fees are paid by agency branch, rather than by number of listings (with online and hybrid agencies working with a ‘branch equivalent’ definition, based on the relative number of listings). Agencies often commit to long-term (five year) contracts, meaning a good level of recurring income (although the absolute proportion is not yet calculable). As part of the reorganisation, member agencies were given the opportunity to enter into new five-year contracts, underpinning future revenue streams and facilitating the next stage of growth. As at the date of the publication of the prospectus, 3,039 branches had signed new five-year contracts, 1,253 were on earlier contracts with more than two years left to run, with the remaining 1,208 on shorter-term rolling contracts.
All to play for
The IPO is intended to provide the opportunity for a transformational step-change in the portal’s position and for development of new consumer and agent products and services, new segments of the property market and new strategic partnerships. The reasons for the flotation are 1) to raise £30m gross (£27m net) of new funds to scale up the group; 2) to facilitate the use of equity to encourage agents to join and increase levels of inventory, in turn driving traffic; and 3) to raise the portal’s profile with the house-buying public, both of which should help to gain market share against the two market majors. The proceeds are also intended to be invested in increasing sales/account management resource and to expand the technological capabilities in platform and product development.
After two years of full operation, OnTheMarket (OTM) had become the third-largest UK property portal provider, after Rightmove (the clear market leader) and ZPG. The portal’s market penetration varies nationally, reflecting the geographic distribution of its founding members. A snapshot of comparative numbers of listings in various locations and property types is shown in Exhibit 1 below.
The business models of OTM, Rightmove and ZPG obviously overlap and they all operate portals that enable estate agents to publish their inventory to a broad, online audience. Although we would not normally discuss competitor business models in our reports, in this instance an understanding of the market dynamics is essential to a proper review of OTM’s positioning and potential.
|
Exhibit 1: Comparative inventory listed |
||||
Property type |
Location |
Portal |
No. of listings |
OTM % of mkt leader |
5+-bed house (to buy) |
Suffolk |
Rightmove |
130 |
|
Zoopla |
66 |
|||
OTM |
32 |
25% |
||
1-bed flat (to rent) |
London N8 |
Rightmove |
89 |
|
Zoopla |
112 |
|||
OTM |
23 |
21% |
||
2-bed flat (to buy) |
Southampton |
Rightmove |
295 |
|
Zoopla |
224 |
|||
OTM |
49 |
17% |
||
3-bed house (to buy) |
Swansea |
Rightmove |
221 |
|
Zoopla |
515 |
|||
OTM |
296 |
57% |
||
2-bed flat (to rent) |
Birmingham |
Rightmove |
948 |
|
Zoopla |
635 |
|||
OTM |
99 |
10% |
||
|
Source: Companies’ websites as at 26 January 2018 |
||||
Rightmove is a pure play portal business, which has successfully grown its agency base to 17,589 (20,358 including new home developers) at the time of its interims to end June 2017. Its market dominance has enabled it to move its ARPA ahead strongly – the CAGR over the last seven years is 18% and the last published number was £911 for H117 (up 10% from £830 in H116). ZPG is the holding company for assets including Zoopla and PrimeLocation. Over the years it has expanded its portfolio to include other comparison websites and consumer services of interest to householders, notably uSwitch. Property accounted for 48% of revenues in its financial year to November 2017, of which two-thirds related to property marketing, with the balance split between software and data services provided to participants in the property market. ZPG generates a lower ARPA than Rightmove in order to attract the inventory that will in turn attract the web traffic and generate leads across the service offer. This gives it a somewhat different relationship with the agency partners and it was from ZPG that OTM attracted most of its early agency partners when the ‘one other portal’ rule was imposed (see section below). At its recent AGM, ZPG stated that it has “signed multiple new long-term portal listing and data services agreements with some of the UK's largest estate agents and mortgage lenders” since its September year-end. ZPG’s ARPA was £359 in FY17, up 3% from the prior year.
Listing property on Rightmove or ZPG portals allows those providers to take ownership of the data generated, giving a further commercial advantage to the arguments for using OTM.
|
Exhibit 2: Agency partners of three main UK portals |
Exhibit 3: Recent growth in portal ARPA |
|
|
|
Source: Companies’ accounts, presentations |
Source: Companies’ presentations |
|
Exhibit 2: Agency partners of three main UK portals |
|
|
Source: Companies’ accounts, presentations |
|
Exhibit 3: Recent growth in portal ARPA |
|
|
Source: Companies’ presentations |
Purplebricks is a hybrid estate agent, as opposed to a portal, so is not directly comparable in terms of business model. Online estate agents and hybrid agents (that use a combination of online operation and local offices, but often covering very large areas) are actual or potential customers rather than competitors.
Exhibit 4: Estate agency groups
OTM group partner agencies |
Branch numbers |
Rest of market |
Branch numbers |
Hunters (announced as on listing) |
211 |
Countrywide |
921 |
SpicerHaart Group |
192 |
Connells |
600 |
Savills |
135 |
LSL |
520 |
Arun (announced as on listing) |
112 |
The Property Franchise Group |
206 |
Knight Frank |
78 |
Leaders/Romans |
147 |
Winkworth |
74 |
Belvoir |
175 |
Strutt & Parker |
64 |
Dexters |
82 |
Kinleigh Folkard & Hayward |
59 |
Andrews |
67 |
The Property Franchise Group |
56 |
Foxtons |
67 |
Chancellors (announced as on listing) |
52 |
Bradleys |
32 |
Jackson-Stops |
46 |
Pattinson |
30 |
Acorn |
42 |
Townends/Regents |
28 |
Nottingham Estate Agency |
38 |
||
Chestertons |
37 |
||
Carter Jonas |
36 |
||
Humberts |
27 |
||
Dacre, Son & Hartley |
25 |
||
Goadsby |
25 |
||
Subtotal |
1,309 |
Subtotal |
2,875 |
Other firms |
c 4,562 |
Other Firms |
9,500 |
Estimated total number of agency branches in UK = 18,246 |
|||
Source: Company
Exhibit 4 above shows the distribution of estate agency groups and also shows how fragmented the overall UK property market remains. A substantial number of the branches being targeted are either entirely independent or operating in groups of three or fewer, with only 4% in organisations of over 125 branches.
The recruitment of agents will also vary by region, but the priority will be given to targeting high stock branches in areas that are already the strongest for the group, leveraging the existing brand awareness. The sales team is being increased by about four-fold post-flotation to around 60 people, with central organisation for analysis of targeting and organisation of appointments.
Adding to the offering
The property listings service offered by OTM is currently not significantly different from those of Rightmove and Zoopla ie the ability to search by region, postcode, number of bedrooms etc. They also all offer participating agents broadly similar reporting tools, which is unsurprising given that the OTM platform was built by the same people who built the PrimeLocation platform.
The ‘new & exclusive’ listings, which appear at the top of the search results grid, are valuable in driving traffic from high quality leads – benefiting from the ‘fear of missing out’. While this is not a contractual obligation, it is to the advantage of participating agents and many keep properties in this category for longer than the typical 24 to 48 hours before releasing to other portals. Around 20% of all listings on OTM first appear on the website in this form.
OTM intends to add comparables and valuation reports in the current financial year and has identified revenue opportunities in additional branding products and valuation-lead products. Given the mutual benefit between a strong performance by OTM and by its participating agents, there is potential to develop market intelligence reports through sharing of data that might otherwise be closely guarded. Other support services may also be developed.
Up to this point, OTM has not carried listings of new properties being marketed directly by property developers. This is an obvious contiguous extension of its offer that can be added easily, subject to suitable agreements being struck with the developers.
Longer term, it may be appropriate to extend to commercial property and some categories of overseas real estate.
Media strategy
The flotation of the group will inevitably increase its visibility in the market – both with partner agencies and with the property-buying public, which in turn should generate increased levels of inventory and therefore traffic to the web portal. However, throwing ‘marketing muscle’ behind the effort should make the impact more robust and encourage vacillating agents and agency groups that their objectives will be best served by joining. The removal of the ‘one other portal’ rule also removes a key obstacle to stepping up recruitment.
Management has outlined its media strategy within the supporting material. The intention is to spend up to £25m in each of year one and year two in order to maximise the impact, dropping to approximately £20m the year after. We have incorporated these figures into our modelling.
There are three elements in the mix (rough split of anticipated spend given in brackets); digital (50%); national campaigns (25%); and local campaigns (25%).
■
Digital spend will focus on strengthening the paid search/SEO, as well as adding to expertise in social. The primary objective is to drive traffic on the portal and increase visitor engagement, in order to drive high quality leads back to the participating agents. The secondary objective is to increase broader brand awareness, which should in turn help to attract new property advertisers and support the existing client base.
■
Building brand awareness is the primary objective of the intended national campaigns, which, again, should bring greater credibility and attract further agency partners. They should also drive traffic and leads.
■
With each local property market having different players, levels of competition and influencing factors, a more targeted geographic campaign can be very effective in building brand awareness, with the same subsidiary benefits.
Individual participating agencies are required to display OTM marketing materials in their marketing collateral, in window displays, in branch and on their websites. In addition, some go much further on a voluntary basis by carrying the logo on car wraps and/or on sale boards.
‘One other portal’ rule modified
In order to build share in a competitive market with larger incumbent players, agents joining OTM committed to list with OTM and a maximum of one other competing portal – effectively a choice between Rightmove and Zoopla. This rule was challenged by an agent, Gascoigne Halman, on the grounds that it limited competition in the market. The Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT) examined the issue closely and issued a comprehensive judgment in July 2017. The crux of the judgement was that, given the effective duopoly in the existing market, the arrangement was actually likely to lead to an improvement in the competitive landscape rather than being a restriction. Gascoigne Halman applied for leave to appeal on competition issues but this was turned down by the CAT in October 2017, whereupon they applied for leave to appeal the judgement in the Court of Appeal (which must be on grounds of point of law). The pursuit of this case occupied a considerable amount of management time, as well as the potential costs overhanging the allocation of capital to growth plans. In August 2017, the CAT returned £1.83m of court deposits to OTM, of which around £1m was spent on marketing soon after.
With the group now raising additional funds to accelerate the agent recruitment programme, the restriction is being rescinded. New contracts that have been negotiated no longer contain this stipulation. Hybrid and online agents are now also able to participate, as well as developers of newbuilds. As the relative competitive positions play out, it may be that branches choose to limit their portal partners to two anyway on economic grounds.
Management team with extensive sectoral experience
CEO Ian Springett founded PrimeLocation in 2000 and managed its sale to DMGT in 2005 for £48m. He remained with the business until 2008 when he left to pursue other interests. He joined the Agents’ Mutual venture at the start of 2013. Previously, Ian was managing director of Lombard Bank following a number of senior roles within NatWest Group.
Commercial director Helen Whiteley joined Agents’ Mutual in August 2013, having previously been sales & marketing director and part of the founding management team at PrimeLocation. Before that, Helen was marketing director at Lombard Bank, having previously worked at Citibank.
CTO Morgan Ross was originally hired at PrimeLocation (working for an outsourced company) as technical director in 2002, being brought in-house as technical director the following year, and finishing as group IT director at The Digital Property Group (2008). In 2009, he joined James Villas as IT director, where he stayed for four years before moving to be global CTO at World Trade Organisation. Morgan joined his former colleagues, Ian Springett and Helen Whiteley, at OTM in November 2013. He is responsible for portal development and operations, as well as for the technical support team.
Brand director John Milsom was also part of the PrimeLocation and OTM-founding team, joining OTM in February 2014. He previously ran his own marcomms business, as well as working for larger advertising agency groups.
CFO Clive Beattie joined OTM in March 2017 to help shape the forward strategy and prepare the company for its IPO. He was previously CEO and CFO of both Croft Associates (a developer of packaging, storage and transportation solutions for radioactive waste) and ThruVision (a manufacturer of security screening products). Clive is ACA qualified and spent over 12 years at UBS Investment Bank following three years at PricewaterhouseCoopers.
The two independent directors are chairman Chris Bell and NED and audit chair, Ian Francis. Chris was CEO of Ladbrokes, a director of Hilton and had senior roles at Allied Lyons. Since 2015, he has been senior independent director at The Rank Group. His non-executive roles have included the chairs of XLMedia and TechFinancials, both successfully listed on AIM, alongside various other senior independent director and NED appointments. Ian is an accountant, having spent most of his career in various roles at Ernst & Young. He is an NED and audit chair at Paysafe Group and performed the same role at Umeme.
Shifting market models on subdued backdrop
Transaction levels flattened out
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Exhibit 5: Long-term UK housing transactions (seasonally adjusted) |
Exhibit 6: Short-term transaction volume change in UK residential market |
|
|
|
Source: HMRC |
Source: HMRC |
|
Exhibit 5: Long-term UK housing transactions (seasonally adjusted) |
|
|
Source: HMRC |
|
Exhibit 6: Short-term transaction volume change in UK residential market |
|
|
Source: HMRC |
There has been much written regarding the health of the UK housing market and, in particular, levels of affordability. The longer-term and more recent patterns of trading volumes are shown in the Exhibits above.
The number of market transactions does not have a direct impact on OTM’s financial performance, its income being a reflection of the number of member/participating agencies, rather than the number of listings that they carry or their success in driving website views to completed transactions. However, it does have an indirect impact – particularly if the stagnation is sustained. As demonstrated above, the market is highly fragmented at a national level but can also be fiercely competitive at a local level. Having an effective and efficient funnel to deliver high-quality leads should prove a competitive advantage. It is even possible that a difficult underlying market may represent a more conducive environment for growing the OTM market reach.
Sensitivities
Our financial modelling makes key assumptions regarding the level of marketing spend and the success in growing the branch agency network. Varying any of these metrics would clearly affect our earnings and balance sheet projections. Given the competitive nature of the market, pricing strategies of one of the main portal operators will have repercussions for other players in the market, including OTM. Our model assumes an initial reduction in ARPA as branch agencies are recruited to the platform in FY19, with growth from the following year moving towards the current level charged by ZPG. This growth in forecast ARPA will be allied with offering additional functionality to participating agents, particularly through the intelligent use of data.
We have also made certain assumptions regarding the success of the marketing spend in recruiting new agencies and agency networks to the OTM portal, which may or may not be reasonable. Because of the plethora and complexity of possible outcomes, we have also made the assumption that new agency partners are attracted by discounted or lower portal listing fees. In reality, there is likely to be equity issued to some, or possibly many, new partners. The important balance will be between the inherent dilution from additional shares versus the benefit to operating profit from the additional volume/ revenue.
We have also included the growth in ‘Other’ revenues within our modelling, comprising add-on products for agents, revenues from advertising new homes from property developers and third-party advertising on the website attracted by increasing levels of traffic.
Outside of the sensitivities from our modelling assumptions, there are a number of internal and external potential factors that may affect the financial performance and the share price. The former would include:
■
Litigation. While the Competition Appeal Tribunal ruled that the ‘one other portal’ rule was not anti-competitive, Gascoigne Halman was granted leave to appeal the ruling at the Court of Appeal on 20 December 2017. A date has yet to be set for the hearing. There are also outstanding claims for breach of contract against Gascoigne Halman (again, with no date set as yet). The conduct of legal cases of this type are invariably heavily time consuming for management and potentially expensive. This intensive phase is now complete. It remains possible that other agents pursue claims against OTM, but there has been no recent correspondence in this respect.
■
The business model is crucially dependent on its IT systems and on its data security, failures of which also would have repercussions for the integrity of the brand. There has been zero downtime on the platform over the year to January 2018.
■
Not all participating agents have entered into lock-in arrangements over their shares as part of renegotiated contracts. Around 6m shares are not covered by the general principles established in these agreements. The lock-up states that 10% of shares can only be sold on or after the first anniversary from admission, 10% on the second anniversary, and the balance following the fifth anniversary.
External factors could relate to:
■
Economic, such as housing affordability and its impact on transactions;
■
Geopolitical influences that may affect buyer confidence – these may be more pertinent in certain parts of the country;
■
Regulatory environment ie money laundering, restrictions on certain types of letting fees, stamp duty etc; or
■
Disruption to the residential property market be it through innovation such as applications of blockchain, or further technical innovation or disintermediation.
Valuation
Peer comparison context
Given the early stage of the group’s development, traditional valuation metrics are not especially useful. With the scale of the planned increase in investment in personnel, IT and marketing spend, OTM will generate substantial losses at the EBITDA level over the next couple of years as the investment goes through. This effectively leaves the only income-based valuation metric it the EV/sales ratio, where OTM sits at a considerable discount to the more established players, as would be expected. OTM at flotation price is valued at an historic EV/sales ratio (based on our estimate of revenues to January 2018) of 4.4x, compared with 16.9x for Rightmove and 6.6x for ZPG. Looking at the broader global context (which, like ZPG, includes some peers with more diverse business models), the sector is trading on average multiples of 10.4x EV/sales and 21.1x EV/EBITDA.
Exhibit 7: Comparative valuations for property listing and portal stocks
Price |
Market |
EV/sales |
EV/EBITDA |
EV/EBIT |
P/E |
Div yield |
|||||
Name |
(reporting currency) |
cap (m) |
FY1 (x) |
FY2 (x) |
FY1 (x) |
FY2 (x) |
FY1 (x) |
FY2 (x) |
FY1 (x) |
FY2 (x) |
FY1 (x) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rightmove (p) |
43.05 |
3,927 |
16.1 |
14.7 |
21.2 |
19.4 |
21.5 |
19.6 |
27.1 |
24.2 |
1.1 |
ZPG (p) |
3.24 |
1,421 |
5.2 |
4.8 |
13.8 |
12.1 |
16.9 |
14.5 |
18.6 |
16.2 |
2.1 |
Purplebricks Group (p) |
4.16 |
1,136 |
10.8 |
5.9 |
0.0 |
||||||
Zillow Group Inc – C (US$) |
43.51 |
8,236 |
7.4 |
6.1 |
33.6 |
24.9 |
62.5 |
47.5 |
83.2 |
50.5 |
0.0 |
REA Group Ltd (AU$) |
71.17 |
9,374 |
11.8 |
10.4 |
20.8 |
17.9 |
22.9 |
19.5 |
32.6 |
27.4 |
1.6 |
Axel Springer SE (€) |
69.40 |
7,493 |
2.6 |
2.6 |
14.1 |
12.4 |
20.3 |
18.8 |
26.8 |
23.6 |
2.8 |
Scout24 AG (€) |
36.04 |
3,880 |
9.3 |
8.5 |
18.2 |
16.0 |
21.9 |
18.7 |
27.3 |
23.4 |
1.1 |
LEG Immobilien AG (€) |
84.58 |
5,353 |
11.7 |
12.1 |
25.3 |
23.4 |
26.1 |
24.4 |
16.8 |
16.7 |
3.6 |
Domain Hdgs Australia (AU$) |
3.03 |
1,742 |
5.3 |
4.7 |
16.6 |
14.1 |
22.0 |
17.7 |
34.4 |
27.1 |
1.5 |
Trade Me Group Ltd (NZ$) |
4.40 |
1,748 |
7.3 |
6.8 |
11.2 |
10.5 |
13.3 |
12.6 |
18.0 |
16.9 |
4.4 |
Average |
8.7 |
7.7 |
19.4 |
16.8 |
25.3 |
21.5 |
31.6 |
25.1 |
1.8 |
||
OnTheMarket |
1.65 |
100 |
3.9 |
2.0 |
-3.6 |
-6.6 |
-3.3 |
-5.6 |
-4.7 |
-9.9 |
0.0 |
Source: Bloomberg, Edison Investment Research. Note: prices as at 7 February 2018. Average EV/EBIT excludes Purplebricks
While it is possible to extrapolate further and make comparisons once OTM has moved into profitability (which we estimate to happen in FY21), the degree of flex in the forecast assumptions would make any derived valuation unreliable.
We have also looked at the narrower UK market in terms of the value that the stock market accords to market reach, for which the proxy is the number of agency partners (note that this calculation is done on ZPG’s number of agency partners, as opposed to its number of property partners). The discrepancy in the EVs is obviously substantial and it would be unwise to assume that OTM’s EV/agency partner ratio would converge towards the others in the short term. However, the direction of travel should be clear. Even if the EV/agency partner were not to change, our modelled increase in the average number of agency partners to 8,500 and 14,750 for FY19 and FY20 respectively (NB year-end is January) works back mechanistically to a theoretical future share price of 224p and 351p respectively.
Exhibit 8: EV/market reach
Price |
Mkt cap |
EV |
EV/sales |
ARPA |
Avg agency partners |
EV/agency partner |
|
RIGHTMOVE PLC |
4305 |
3,927 |
3,905 |
16.9 |
842 |
20,358 |
£191,816 |
ZPG PLC |
324 |
1,421 |
1,613 |
7.0 |
358 |
14,775 |
£109,171 |
OTM PLC |
165 |
100 |
70.8 |
4.4 |
234 |
5,700 |
£12,421 |
Source: Bloomberg, Company reports, Edison Investment Research. Note: Prices as at 7 February 2018.
Cash flow-based valuation
Exhibit 9: Free cash flow record and forecasts
|
FY15 |
FY16 |
FY17 |
FY18e |
FY19e |
FY20e |
FY21e |
FY22e |
FY23e |
FY24e |
FY25e |
FY26e |
FY27e |
Net revenue |
1,983 |
17,851 |
17,831 |
16,000 |
18,000 |
35,000 |
63,600 |
77,000 |
89,373 |
99,266 |
105,291 |
108,749 |
109,293 |
Net sales revenue y-o-y growth (%) |
na |
800.2% |
-0.1% |
-10.3% |
12.5% |
94.4% |
81.7% |
21.1% |
16.1% |
11.1% |
6.1% |
3.3% |
0.5% |
Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) |
-2,522 |
-1,729 |
-1,182 |
1,500 |
-24,400 |
-12,750 |
16,100 |
28,140 |
31,768 |
34,292 |
35,320 |
35,393 |
34,477 |
EBIT margin (%) |
-127% |
-9.7% |
-6.6% |
9.4% |
-136% |
-36.4% |
25.3% |
36.5% |
35.5% |
34.5% |
33.5% |
32.5% |
31.5% |
Depreciation & amortisation |
19 |
589 |
968 |
1,513 |
1,773 |
1,981 |
2,298 |
2,504 |
2,906 |
3,228 |
3,424 |
3,536 |
3,554 |
as a % of sales (%) |
1.0% |
3.3% |
5.4% |
9.5% |
9.9% |
5.7% |
3.6% |
3.3% |
3.3% |
3.3% |
3.3% |
3.3% |
3.3% |
Tax paid on EBIT |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2,550 |
-3,220 |
-5,628 |
-6,354 |
-6,858 |
-7,064 |
-7,079 |
-6,895 |
Tax rate (%) |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
0.0% |
20.0% |
20.0% |
20.0% |
20.0% |
20.0% |
20.0% |
20.0% |
20.0% |
Gross cash flow |
-2,503 |
-1,140 |
-214 |
3,013 |
-22,627 |
-8,219 |
15,178 |
25,016 |
28,321 |
30,661 |
31,680 |
31,850 |
31,135 |
Decr/(incr) in net working cap |
-1,309 |
3,509 |
-42 |
500 |
534 |
-1,263 |
-681 |
246 |
251 |
201 |
122 |
70 |
11 |
Net working capital |
1,240 |
-2,269 |
-2,228 |
-2,728 |
-3,262 |
-1,999 |
-1,318 |
-1,563 |
-1,815 |
-2,015 |
-2,138 |
-2,208 |
-2,219 |
as a % of sales (%) |
62.5% |
-12.7% |
-12.5% |
-17.0% |
-18.1% |
-5.7% |
-2.1% |
-2.0% |
-2.0% |
-2.0% |
-2.0% |
-2.0% |
-2.0% |
Net capital expenditure |
-1,543 |
-2,008 |
-1,623 |
-1,493 |
-2,180 |
-2,350 |
-2,636 |
-2,770 |
-3,153 |
-3,434 |
-3,569 |
-3,611 |
-3,554 |
as a % of sales (%) |
77.8% |
11.2% |
9.1% |
9.3% |
12.1% |
6.7% |
4.1% |
3.6% |
3.5% |
3.5% |
3.4% |
3.3% |
3.3% |
Change in other op. assets |
655 |
1,394 |
1,352 |
763 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
Free cash flows |
-4,700 |
1,755 |
-527 |
2,783 |
-24,273 |
-11,832 |
11,861 |
22,492 |
25,418 |
27,428 |
28,233 |
28,309 |
27,592 |
Source: Company accounts, Edison Investment Research
Given the problems inherent with earnings-based methodologies expressed above, we have also looked at valuation based on discounted cash flow. Again, this is highly dependent on the modelling, particularly with respect to the marketing spend and the return earned on it in terms of agency recruitment.
Exhibit 10: NPV calculation
Asset valuation |
|||||
Present value of forecast cash flows (2018-2027) |
|
|
|
|
58,727 |
Present value of forecast cash flows (2028-perpetuity) |
|
|
|
107,461 |
|
less cash |
|
|
|
-29,182 |
|
Total valuation |
|
|
|
195,370 |
|
NPV/share (as at 4 February 2018) |
|
|
|
|
323p |
Current share price |
|
|
|
165p |
|
Upside/(downside) to NPV/share |
|
|
|
|
95.8% |
Source: Edison Investment Research
Under our modelled scenario, with the business moving into profit from FY21, the free cash flows become substantial from that year on. We have assumed a small amount of debt is taken on during FY20e to over the funding gap before the cash flows turn positive again. Based on a WACC of 10.2% and a long-term growth rate of 0.5%, the NPV of the cash flows equates to a share price of 323p, 95.8% ahead of the issue price. A 323p share price would give an EV of £166.3m and an FY18 EV/sales multiple of 10.4x and an EV/agency partner figure of £29k. This is obviously not adjusted for any implementation risk (although it should be noted that there is also sensitivity on the upside). Setting this adjustment at 30% would indicate a share price of 226p, a 37% premium to the issue price of 165p.
We have also looked at the sensitivity of the DCF to changes to the key drivers under three alternative scenarios:
1)
Marketing spend is lower at £20m in year one and in year two and at £15m in year three, but with no alteration to the number of agencies recruited or ARPA. This would increase the NPV of the cash flows to 388p.
2)
ARPA grows at a slower pace, from £170 in FY19 (unchanged), to £200 in FY20, £250 in FY21 and £275 in FY22. This delivers an NPV of 290p.
3)
25% fewer branches are recruited than our core model, but other metrics are unchanged. This produces a value of 293p.
These values are all without any further adjustment for execution risk.
Financials
Earnings growth hinges on partner recruitment...
The revenues of OTM simply consist of the listing fees paid by agency partners, with other sources of income (principally listing fees of new properties) starting to build over time. These are the key drivers of our revenue model, as shown below. Revenues in the year just ended (yet to be reported) will be down on the prior year, reflecting the disruption to the business with regards to a) the demutualisation; b) the negotiations of new contracts with existing agencies; c) the absorption of management time in dealing with the litigation; and d) lack of funds / resources.
We have assumed that the number of partner agencies will now rebuild and exceed previous levels, with the first step up already established with the recruitment of three agency groups (highlighted in Exhibit 3, above) contingent on the listing of OTM shares. Between them, they bring an additional 375 agency branches to the group. It should be noted that the estate agency market remains highly fragmented and that there are a limited number of sizeable groups to target, again shown in this exhibit. Once recruited, this income stream is attractive, with high levels of recurring revenues over predominantly five-year listing agreements.
The successes in drawing agencies onto the OTM platform will depend on both the attractiveness of the equity participation (which will help with the ‘stickiness’ of the business brought in) and the return on the deployment of the marketing spend. To date, OTM has spent just under £20m, split 38% on TV and press campaigns, 61% on paid search and digital advertising, with the small balance on local press, radio and posters. Management intends to spend up to £25m in each of the first two years to support the ‘land grab’, reducing thereafter to approximately £20m in year three. We have used these figures in our modelling.
...then moving ARPA ahead
Exhibit 11: Revenue and EBIT drivers
|
FY2015A |
FY2016A |
FY2017A |
FY2018F |
FY2019F |
FY2020F |
FY2021F |
FY2022F |
||||
Revenue (£’000s) |
1,983 |
17,851 |
17,831 |
16,000 |
18,000 |
35,000 |
63,600 |
77,000 |
||||
EBIT (£’000s) |
-2,522 |
-1,729 |
-1,182 |
1,500 |
-24,400 |
-12,750 |
16,100 |
28,140 |
||||
Revenue Drivers |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Revenue from listing fees (£’000s) |
1983 |
17,851 |
17,831 |
16,000 |
18,000 |
33,300 |
59,600 |
62,000 |
||||
Average number of branches |
na |
5,516 |
6,306 |
5,700 |
8,500 |
14,750 |
17,500 |
17,500 |
||||
Net additions to branches |
|
|
790 |
-606 |
2,800 |
6,250 |
2,750 |
0 |
||||
Average listing fee per branch (£/mth) |
na |
270 |
236 |
234 |
176 |
188 |
284 |
295 |
||||
Y-O-Y Growth (%) |
na |
na |
-12.6% |
-0.7% |
-24.6% |
6.6% |
50.9% |
4.0% |
||||
Other Income (£’000s) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
1,700 |
4,000 |
15,000 |
||||
Total Revenue (£’000s) |
1,983 |
17,851 |
17,831 |
16,000 |
18,000 |
35,000 |
63,600 |
77,000 |
||||
Overall ARPA (£/mth) |
na |
270 |
236 |
234 |
176 |
198 |
303 |
367 |
||||
EBIT Drivers |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
||||
Staff Cost (£’000s) |
-2,097 |
-4125 |
-4,353 |
-3,500 |
-9,000 |
-14,000 |
-17,961 |
-18,859 |
||||
as a % of sales |
105.7% |
23.1% |
24.4% |
21.9% |
50.0% |
40.0% |
28.2% |
24.5% |
||||
Non-Staff Overhead (ex-Exceptional Costs) (£’000s) |
-1,019 |
-2955 |
-4,154 |
-6,500 |
-8,000 |
-8,750 |
-9,539 |
-10,001 |
||||
as a % of sales |
51.4% |
16.6% |
23.3% |
40.6% |
44.4% |
25.0% |
15.0% |
13.0% |
||||
EBIT before Marketing costs (£’000s) |
-1,133 |
10,771 |
9,324 |
6,000 |
1,000 |
12,250 |
36,100 |
48,140 |
||||
Marketing Costs (£’000s) |
-1,389 |
-12500 |
-7,000 |
-2,500 |
-22,500 |
-24,999 |
-20,000 |
-20,000 |
||||
as a % of sales |
70.0% |
70.0% |
39.3% |
15.6% |
125.0% |
71.4% |
31.4% |
26.0% |
||||
EBIT before exceptional items (£’000s) |
-2,522 |
-1,729 |
2,324 |
3,500 |
-21,500 |
-12,750 |
16,100 |
28,140 |
||||
Exceptional Items (£’000s) |
0 |
0 |
-3,506 |
-2,000 |
-2,900 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||||
EBIT after exceptional items (£’000s) |
-2,522 |
-1,729 |
-1,182 |
1,500 |
-24,400 |
-12,750 |
16,100 |
28,140 |
||||
EBIT Margin (%) |
-127.2% |
-9.7% |
-6.6% |
9.4% |
-135.6% |
-36.4% |
25.3% |
36.5% |
||||
Source: Company accounts, Edison Investment Research
The business model is still at an early stage of development and there is little to be sensibly gleaned from the financial record to date. There was obviously rapid growth during FY16 when the first agency networks came together, followed by year of consolidation. The plan had been to continue to scale up and float the business. The process of demutualisation was a lengthy and intricate process as the participants’ interests were not necessarily fully aligned. This, and the litigation described above, both absorbed a deal of resource (time and money) that would otherwise have been focused in developing and growing the business. Marketing costs were reined in and the group has fallen behind its initially planned itinerary.
We show the revenue and operating margin history of Rightmove and ZPG to put our margin assumptions into context in the Exhibits below.
|
Exhibit 12: Rightmove revenue and margin history |
Exhibit 13: ZPG revenue and margin history |
|
|
|
Source: Company accounts. Note: adjusted for exceptionals, SBP. |
Source: Company accounts. Note: adjusted for exceptionals, SBP. |
|
Exhibit 12: Rightmove revenue and margin history |
|
|
Source: Company accounts. Note: adjusted for exceptionals, SBP. |
|
Exhibit 13: ZPG revenue and margin history |
|
|
Source: Company accounts. Note: adjusted for exceptionals, SBP. |
Scaling up inevitably means additional resource and around a quarter of the flotation proceeds are to be targeted at scaling up the infrastructure, adding to the IT development and to the sales teams. Despite the higher levels of both staff costs and non-staff overhead, our model shows the business remaining EBIT positive pre-marketing costs even in FY19, where the scaling up is likely to be greatest. This investment will enable the group to build a valuable data resource which can be used to benefit both OTM and its clients, the agencies. The level and sophistication of data usage currently should be considerably enhanced, building data products of benefit to partner agencies (so driving up the ARPA by delivering greater value) and through the introduction of relevant third-party targeted advertising to the portal.
Our modelling indicates OTM moving into profit at the pre-tax level during FY21 (beyond our published forecast horizon).
Cash flow investment phase
Our cash flow modelling is shown in Exhibit 9, above. The group could choose to conserve cash by reining in the marketing spend, but this may compromise the forecast growth profile and the conversion of agents on to paying (or higher paying) contracts. On the basis shown here, OTM turns cash flow positive at both the gross and net cash level in FY21. At their last reported results, ZPG showed operating profit to cash conversion of 88% and Rightmove 101%. As OTM matures, there should be no structural reason why it should not achieve similar levels – although we have modelled a more conservative 80% in the medium term.
Balance sheet strength depends on structure of deals, spend
The £30m gross placing proceeds on flotation are below the level that market commentary indicated during the demutualisation phase in summer 2017 (reported to be £50m). We understand from management that the lower raise did not have a fundamental impact on the business plans as a £50m raise had significant headroom to deliver the strategy. OTM has to date been funded by its founding agencies in the form of loan notes, with coupons of between 7% and 15% and, most significantly, by revenues from agents’ listing fees.
The loan notes have been redeemed and converted to equity on the float.
The Edison model assumes that the funding, together with ongoing revenues from agents’ listing fees, is sufficient to cover the additional spending plans through FY19, with the assumption of a modest amount of debt by end FY20, before moving back into a net cash position the following year. The timing and outturn could obviously vary considerably from this scenario.
Exhibit 14: Financial summary
£'k |
2015 |
2016 |
2017 |
2018e |
2019e |
2020e |
||
31-January |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
||
INCOME STATEMENT |
||||||||
Revenue |
|
|
1,983 |
17,851 |
17,831 |
16,000 |
18,000 |
35,000 |
EBITDA |
|
|
(2,503) |
(1,140) |
3,292 |
5,013 |
(19,727) |
(10,769) |
Normalised operating profit |
|
|
(2,522) |
(1,729) |
2,324 |
3,500 |
(21,500) |
(12,750) |
Amortisation of acquired intangibles |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Exceptionals |
0 |
0 |
(3,506) |
(2,000) |
(2,900) |
0 |
||
Share-based payments |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Reported operating profit |
(2,522) |
(1,729) |
(1,182) |
1,500 |
(24,400) |
(12,750) |
||
Net Interest |
(655) |
(1,394) |
(1,351) |
(1,300) |
146 |
123 |
||
Joint ventures & associates (post tax) |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Exceptionals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Profit Before Tax (norm) |
|
|
(3,177) |
(3,123) |
973 |
2,200 |
(21,354) |
(12,627) |
Profit Before Tax (reported) |
|
|
(3,177) |
(3,123) |
(2,533) |
200 |
(24,254) |
(12,627) |
Reported tax |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2,525 |
||
Profit After Tax (norm) |
(3,177) |
(3,123) |
973 |
2,200 |
(21,354) |
(10,102) |
||
Profit After Tax (reported) |
(3,177) |
(3,123) |
(2,533) |
200 |
(24,254) |
(10,102) |
||
Minority interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Discontinued operations |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Net income (normalised) |
(3,177) |
(3,123) |
973 |
2,200 |
(21,354) |
(10,102) |
||
Net income (reported) |
(3,177) |
(3,123) |
(2,533) |
200 |
(24,254) |
(10,102) |
||
Basic average number of shares outstanding (m) |
36 |
36 |
36 |
36 |
61 |
61 |
||
EPS - normalised (p) |
|
|
(8.9) |
(8.8) |
2.7 |
6.2 |
(35.3) |
(16.7) |
EPS - normalised fully diluted (p) |
|
|
(8.9) |
(8.8) |
2.7 |
6.2 |
(35.3) |
(16.7) |
EPS - basic reported (p) |
|
|
(8.9) |
(8.8) |
(7.1) |
0.6 |
(40.1) |
(16.7) |
Dividend (p) |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Revenue growth (%) |
N/A |
899.2 |
98.9 |
88.7 |
111.5 |
193.4 |
||
EBITDA Margin (%) |
-126.2 |
-6.4 |
18.5 |
31.3 |
-109.6 |
-30.8 |
||
Normalised Operating Margin |
-127.2 |
-9.7 |
13.0 |
21.9 |
-119.4 |
-36.4 |
||
BALANCE SHEET |
||||||||
Fixed Assets |
|
|
1,527 |
2,946 |
3,601 |
3,581 |
3,988 |
4,357 |
Intangible Assets |
1,449 |
2,874 |
3,556 |
3,483 |
3,787 |
3,964 |
||
Tangible Assets |
78 |
72 |
45 |
98 |
200 |
393 |
||
Investments & other |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Current Assets |
|
|
5,356 |
4,200 |
5,972 |
3,770 |
8,503 |
5,998 |
Stocks |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Debtors |
3,320 |
638 |
3,709 |
1,419 |
1,578 |
3,998 |
||
Cash & cash equivalents |
2,036 |
3,562 |
2,263 |
2,351 |
6,925 |
2,000 |
||
Other |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Current Liabilities |
|
|
(3,087) |
(3,872) |
(7,316) |
(4,895) |
(5,588) |
(6,744) |
Creditors |
(2,080) |
(2,907) |
(5,937) |
(4,147) |
(4,840) |
(5,996) |
||
Tax and social security |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Short term borrowings |
(1,007) |
(965) |
(1,379) |
(748) |
(748) |
(748) |
||
Other |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Long Term Liabilities |
|
|
(7,139) |
(9,740) |
(11,256) |
(11,256) |
(1) |
(6,810) |
Long term borrowings |
(7,139) |
(9,740) |
(11,256) |
(11,256) |
(1) |
(6,810) |
||
Other long term liabilities |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Net Assets |
|
|
(3,343) |
(6,466) |
(8,999) |
(8,799) |
6,902 |
(3,200) |
Minority interests |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Shareholders' equity |
|
|
(3,343) |
(6,466) |
(8,999) |
(8,799) |
6,902 |
(3,200) |
CASH FLOW |
||||||||
Op Cash Flow before WC and tax |
(2,503) |
(1,140) |
3,292 |
5,013 |
(19,727) |
(10,769) |
||
Working capital |
(1,309) |
3,509 |
(42) |
500 |
534 |
(1,263) |
||
Exceptional & other |
0 |
0 |
(3,506) |
(2,000) |
(2,900) |
0 |
||
Tax |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
2,525 |
||
Net operating cash flow |
|
|
(3,812) |
2,369 |
(256) |
3,512 |
(22,093) |
(9,507) |
Capex |
(1,543) |
(2,008) |
(1,623) |
(1,493) |
(2,180) |
(2,350) |
||
Acquisitions/disposals |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Net interest |
(86) |
(998) |
(937) |
(1,394) |
(1,154) |
123 |
||
Equity financing |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
41,255 |
0 |
||
Dividends |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Other |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Net Cash Flow |
(5,441) |
(637) |
(2,816) |
626 |
15,828 |
(11,734) |
||
Opening net (cash)/debt |
|
|
273 |
5,714 |
6,747 |
9,976 |
9,423 |
(6,406) |
FX |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
0 |
||
Other non-cash movements |
0 |
(396) |
(413) |
(72) |
(0) |
0 |
||
Closing net (cash)/debt |
|
|
5,714 |
6,747 |
9,976 |
9,423 |
(6,406) |
5,328 |
Source: Company accounts, Edison Investment Research
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|
Research: Investment Companies
Atlantis Japan Growth Fund (AJG) aims to generate long-term capital growth from a diversified portfolio of primarily mid- and small-cap Japanese equities. In 2016, in response to shareholder concerns, which included the trust’s investment performance, the board appointed deputy fund adviser Taeko Setaishi to the position of lead fund adviser. Since then, AJG’s performance has improved. The trust has outperformed its TOPIX benchmark over one, three, five and 10 years, and is the best-performing fund, out of four, in the AIC Japanese Smaller Companies sector over one year. Given the improving economic backdrop in Japan and relatively attractive company valuations, Setaishi is positive on the outlook for Japanese equities and she continues to find interesting growth opportunities across a variety of sectors.