La Doria |
A challenging environment |
H116 results |
Food & beverages |
5 October 2016 |
Share price performance
Business description
Next events
Analysts
La Doria is a research client of Edison Investment Research Limited |
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Following an exceptionally strong FY15, H1 16 brought a perfect storm of a weak macroeconomic backdrop in many end-markets, sterling devaluation, a weak tomato campaign and higher fruit and pulse costs. Management has therefore updated its rolling three-year plan for the more challenging environment and revised down estimates. Our DCF-derived fair value moves to €10.91/share (from €15.84) given the downgrades to estimates.
Year |
Revenue (€m) |
PBT* |
EPS* |
DPS |
P/E |
Yield |
12/15 |
748.3 |
61.0 |
144.6 |
28.0 |
5.8 |
3.3 |
12/16e |
654.8 |
43.1 |
97.3 |
21.0 |
8.6 |
2.5 |
12/17e |
661.3 |
35.2 |
79.5 |
17.0 |
10.6 |
2.0 |
12/18e |
701.0 |
45.3 |
102.2 |
24.0 |
8.2 |
2.9 |
Note: *PBT and EPS are normalised, excluding amortisation of acquired intangibles, exceptional items and share-based payments.
Challenging H1 results and storm clouds ahead
H1 results were characterised by generally lower sales prices across all products with the exception of the fruit line, lower volumes for the sauces and juices segments (stable volumes for other categories) and sterling devaluation. The outlook is challenging, as the macroeconomic environment remains tough, with deflation in a number of markets. This will have an effect on operating leverage, as the reduction in selling prices will not be fully offset by the reduction in production costs. Sterling devaluation will also take its toll as 50% of revenues stem from the UK business, but most costs are euro and US dollar-denominated.
Strategy remains on track
La Doria’s strategy is to grow the higher added-value product categories to reduce the overall exposure of the group to the volatility in the tomato-based product line. Management remains committed to this objective.
Business plan update and forecast reductions
In light of the above-mentioned weaker trading conditions, management has updated its rolling three-year business plan. Estimates are cut across the board, and 2017 is now expected to be a trough year for profit margins. The annual tomato campaign is over and the majority of contracts have been negotiated, thus giving the company good visibility over the shape of the division’s P&L for the next 12 months. In terms of the vegetable and fruit lines, the bulk of negotiations are due in Q3 and thus the outlook is less certain, but management has taken a cautious stance. We have cut our estimates to reflect the updated business plan. Our net profit is cut by 17% and 39% respectively for 2016e and 2017e.
Valuation: Material upside
Based on our updated forecasts, our DCF model points to a fair value of €10.91 per share, or 30% upside from the current share price. We calculate that La Doria now trades on 8.6x 2016e P/E and 6.9x 2016e EV/EBITDA, at c 55% and c 30% respective discounts to its private-label peer group.
Updated rolling three-year plan
La Doria outlines its financial targets and strategic business plan for a rolling three-year period, usually at the beginning of each financial year. In light of a somewhat perfect storm of a challenging tomato campaign, higher pulse and fruit costs, a deflationary environment in many end-markets and sterling devaluation post Brexit, the company has updated its business plan with the H1 results.
The company’s new financial targets are significantly below those set out in February, as illustrated in Exhibit 1 below.
Exhibit 1: Previous versus current targets
2016e |
2017e |
|||||
€m |
Old |
New |
% change |
Old |
New |
% change |
Revenue |
685.4 |
656.0 |
(4.3) |
722.5 |
661.0 |
(8.5) |
EBITDA |
68.4 |
57.0 |
(16.7) |
72.9 |
50.0 |
(31.4) |
EBIT |
55.3 |
42.2 |
(23.7) |
60.1 |
37.2 |
(38.1) |
PBT |
52.1 |
42.2 |
(19.0) |
57.3 |
34.4 |
(40.0) |
Net profit |
36.8 |
29.6 |
(19.6) |
41.2 |
25.0 |
(39.3) |
Net debt |
110.4 |
116.2 |
5.3 |
86.9 |
100.4 |
15.5 |
EBITDA margin |
10.0% |
8.7% |
(1.3) |
10.1% |
7.6% |
(2.5) |
EBIT margin |
8.1% |
6.4% |
(1.6) |
8.3% |
5.6% |
(2.7) |
Source: Company data
La Doria’s strategic objectives remain broadly the same, thus giving the business a solid level of continuity. The objectives to grow the higher added-value product categories and to pursue international expansion tie in with the overarching objective of reducing the volatility and seasonality of the business. We note new products include ready-made sauces as well as soups, minestrone and enriched baked beans, which have all made a promising start. That said, soups, minestrone and baked beans are mainly exposed to the UK market and therefore may suffer due to Brexit.
La Doria continues to believe that the structural long-term trend of private-label (PL) growth at the expense of brands will continue, and indeed industry trends support this view. Management believes the premium and bio/organic segments within PL are particularly attractive. Not only are they higher added value and hence inherently have a superior business profile for La Doria, in particular with higher margins, but they also tap into current consumer preferences. Management continues to believe that supermarkets will increasingly focus on quality and the premium end of private label, with greater attention paid to ethical and environmental considerations and product safety as differentiators. We believe this is the right strategy.
Financials
Business update
The 2015 tomato campaign was characterised by a 10% increase in tomato production at the national level, in line with industry forecasts, but a weaker than expected outcome to pricing negotiations. For 2016, overall industry tomato production was expected to be down 10%, and that was indeed the case. Higher costs were also forecast as raw material costs were up. In addition, the low quality of the tomato crop led to lower industrial yields. The disappointment in 2016 was once again lower selling prices, and these were caused by a small number of manufacturers to the market, which had excess stock and hence were willing to sell at lower prices in the more price-sensitive geographies.
The 2016 tomato campaign itself (which occurred, as always, between July and September) was a tale of two halves. The first half went very well, with a good quality crop and hence industrial yields were high. The second half, however, was marred by bad weather and hence the physical harvesting was impeded. The crop was therefore lower than expected and worse quality, thus increasing the overall production cost. Both industrial yields and manufacturing efficiencies were lower due to tomato quality issues and volumes being below expectations.
Given that the majority of the negotiations for the red line have now happened, there is good visibility on the business for the next 12 months. For the fruit and vegetables/pulses lines, the contracts are mainly negotiated during Q4, and therefore we do not yet have full visibility. That said, management expects deflation to be an issue across the board, and hence these categories will be no different. In terms of costs, harvests have tended to be lower and costs have been higher.
Sterling devaluation
It is still early days to judge the long-term impact of Brexit on consumption patterns. However, the immediate effect was the significant devaluation of sterling. As a reminder, La Doria derives c 50% of its revenue from the UK. Of course, the competition will also encounter higher raw material costs as a function of their euro denomination, but UK-based competitors will have the advantage of having some sterling-denominated costs to mitigate the impact, while LDH (La Doria) Ltd (LDH) is a trading company and the majority of costs are euro-denominated. As a reminder, La Doria now consolidates 100% of its minorities and treats as debt the value of the put options that exist against it.
H116 results
Consolidated revenues were down 12% to €334.6m given the lower selling prices across the board and the deflationary economic environment. EBITDA was down 21% to €26.8m, with the EBITDA margin down 90bp to 8.0%. EBIT was down 32% to €18.6m, with the EBIT margin down 160bp to 5.6%. Net debt was down to €81.9m vs €130m at the end of FY15 and €88.7m at the end of H115. Sterling devaluation is obviously likely to be a greater feature in H2 given the timing of the EU referendum towards the very end of H1.
Forecasts
We cut our forecasts to reflect the updated three-year plan. We note 2017 is expected to be a trough year in respect of margins, implying some recovery in the 2017 contract negotiation, which should mainly affect 2018.
Exhibit 2: New versus old forecasts
2016e |
2017e |
|||||
€m |
Old |
New |
% change |
Old |
New |
% change |
Revenue |
684.7 |
654.8 |
(4.4) |
718.9 |
661.3 |
(8.0) |
EBITDA |
68.3 |
58.1 |
(14.9) |
73.1 |
50.7 |
(30.6) |
EBIT |
54.9 |
43.1 |
(21.5) |
60.7 |
38.2 |
(37.0) |
PBT |
51.9 |
43.1 |
(16.9) |
57.7 |
35.2 |
(39.0) |
Net profit |
36.3 |
30.2 |
(16.9) |
40.4 |
24.7 |
(39.0) |
Net debt |
109.3 |
115.3 |
5.5 |
85.4 |
99.4 |
16.4 |
EBITDA margin |
10.0% |
8.9% |
(1.1) |
10.2% |
7.7% |
(2.5) |
EBIT margin |
8.0% |
6.6% |
(1.4) |
8.4% |
5.8% |
(2.7) |
Source: Edison Investment Research
Valuation
La Doria’s share price has significantly underperformed over the last three and six months, mostly due to the devaluation of sterling following Brexit, but also due to the weak macroeconomic environment and the tough 2016 tomato campaign. Over the past three months, La Doria is down c 25% vs the FTSE MIB index, which is down 0.1%. Despite this, on 2016 estimates, La Doria trades on 8.6x P/E and 6.9x EV/EBITDA, with a 2.5% dividend yield. This compares to the peer group of private-label and small-cap food manufacturers on 19.2x and 9.8x, or a discount of c 55% and c 30% respectively, which we believe is unwarranted.
Exhibit 3: Benchmark valuation of La Doria relative to peers
P/E (x) |
EV/EBITDA (x) |
Dividend yield (%) |
|||||
Market cap (m) |
2016e |
2017e |
2016e |
2017e |
2016e |
2017e |
|
Greencore |
£1,396.6 |
17.4 |
16.0 |
12.8 |
11.3 |
2.0% |
2.2% |
Ebro Foods |
€ 3,221.2 |
18.8 |
17.5 |
10.6 |
9.8 |
3.1% |
3.3% |
Parmalat |
€ 4,370.7 |
28.7 |
22.9 |
8.8 |
7.7 |
0.9% |
0.8% |
Bonduelle |
€ 693.8 |
10.4 |
9.5 |
6.0 |
5.3 |
2.2% |
2.3% |
Valsoia |
€ 185.4 |
20.6 |
19.2 |
11.0 |
10.0 |
1.4% |
1.5% |
Peer group average |
19.2 |
17.0 |
9.8 |
8.8 |
1.9% |
2.0% |
|
La Doria |
€ 260.4 |
8.6 |
10.6 |
6.9 |
7.9 |
2.5% |
2.0% |
Premium/(discount) to peer group |
-54.9% |
-37.9% |
-30.2% |
-11.0% |
30.3% |
-1.0% |
|
Source: Edison Investment Research estimates and Bloomberg consensus. Note: Prices at 26 September 2016.
Our primary valuation methodology is DCF analysis and we calculate a fair value of €10.91, or 26% upside from the current level. This is based on our assumptions of a 1.0% terminal growth rate and a 7.5% terminal EBIT margin. Our WACC of 6.0% is predicated on an equity risk premium of 4%, a borrowing spread of 5% and beta of 0.8. Below, we show a sensitivity analysis to these assumptions and note that the current share price is discounting a terminal EBIT margin of 7.0% (which compares to La Doria’s already reported EBIT margin of 8.1% in 2015, and a company target of 5.6% EBIT margin at the trough in 2017e) and a terminal growth rate of c 0%.
Exhibit 4: DCF sensitivity to terminal growth rate and EBIT margin (€ per share)
Terminal growth |
EBIT margin |
|||||||
6.5% |
7.0% |
7.5% |
8.0% |
8.5% |
9.0% |
|||
-2.0% |
6.2 |
6.7 |
7.3 |
7.8 |
8.4 |
8.9 |
||
-1.0% |
6.9 |
7.5 |
8.2 |
8.8 |
9.4 |
10.1 |
||
0.0% |
7.8 |
8.6 |
9.3 |
10.1 |
10.8 |
11.6 |
||
1.0% |
9.1 |
10.0 |
10.9 |
11.8 |
12.7 |
13.6 |
||
2.0% |
11.0 |
12.1 |
13.2 |
14.3 |
15.5 |
16.6 |
||
3.0% |
14.0 |
15.5 |
16.9 |
18.4 |
19.9 |
21.3 |
||
4.0% |
19.6 |
21.7 |
23.8 |
25.9 |
28.0 |
30.1 |
||
Source: Edison Investment Research estimates
Key sensitivities
La Doria’s key sensitivities include:
■
input cost inflation on the agricultural commodities it processes to manufacture its products;
■
the supply/demand balance affecting the achievability of finished goods price inflation;
■
consumer consumption patterns and competitive pressures, particularly in Europe with a subdued economic environment, although La Doria and PL in general should benefit from any consumer down trading; and
■
foreign exchange, specifically euro/sterling due to the consolidation of its trading subsidiary LDH.
Exhibit 5: Financial summary
€m |
2013 |
2014 |
2015 |
2016e |
2017e |
2018e |
||
December |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
IFRS |
||
PROFIT & LOSS |
||||||||
Revenue |
|
|
604.4 |
631.4 |
748.3 |
654.8 |
661.3 |
701.0 |
Cost of Sales |
(521.2) |
(527.6) |
(616.9) |
(550.2) |
(564.3) |
(591.2) |
||
Gross Profit |
83.2 |
103.8 |
131.5 |
104.5 |
97.0 |
109.8 |
||
EBITDA |
|
|
43.4 |
60.0 |
77.6 |
58.1 |
50.7 |
61.5 |
Operating Profit (before amort. and except.) |
31.3 |
48.1 |
61.0 |
43.1 |
38.2 |
49.0 |
||
Intangible Amortisation |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Exceptionals |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
FX gain/(loss) |
2.5 |
0.3 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Operating Profit |
33.8 |
48.4 |
61.0 |
43.1 |
38.2 |
49.0 |
||
Net Interest |
(4.7) |
(4.1) |
0.0 |
0.0 |
(3.0) |
(3.7) |
||
Profit Before Tax (norm) |
|
|
26.6 |
44.0 |
61.0 |
43.1 |
35.2 |
45.3 |
Profit Before Tax (FRS 3) |
|
|
29.2 |
44.3 |
61.0 |
43.1 |
35.2 |
45.3 |
Tax |
(7.9) |
(14.3) |
(16.1) |
(12.9) |
(10.6) |
(13.6) |
||
Profit After Tax (norm) |
19.7 |
29.9 |
44.8 |
30.2 |
24.7 |
31.7 |
||
Profit After Tax (FRS 3) |
21.2 |
29.9 |
44.8 |
30.2 |
24.7 |
31.7 |
||
Average Number of Shares Outstanding (m) |
29.5 |
30.6 |
31.0 |
31.0 |
31.0 |
31.0 |
||
EPS - normalised fully diluted (c) |
|
|
45.1 |
80.5 |
144.6 |
97.3 |
79.5 |
102.2 |
EPS - (IFRS) (c) |
|
|
52.5 |
81.5 |
144.6 |
97.3 |
79.5 |
102.2 |
Dividend per share (c) |
12.0 |
22.0 |
25.0 |
26.0 |
27.0 |
28.0 |
||
Gross Margin (%) |
13.8 |
16.4 |
17.6 |
16.0 |
14.7 |
15.7 |
||
EBITDA Margin (%) |
7.2 |
9.5 |
10.4 |
8.9 |
7.7 |
8.8 |
||
Operating Margin (before GW and except.) (%) |
5.2 |
7.6 |
8.1 |
6.6 |
5.8 |
7.0 |
||
BALANCE SHEET |
||||||||
Fixed Assets |
|
|
114.8 |
179.6 |
177.6 |
173.6 |
171.6 |
169.6 |
Intangible Assets |
4.0 |
10.6 |
10.6 |
9.9 |
9.2 |
8.5 |
||
Tangible Assets |
98.9 |
146.6 |
143.3 |
140.0 |
138.7 |
137.4 |
||
Investments |
11.9 |
22.3 |
23.7 |
23.7 |
23.7 |
23.7 |
||
Current Assets |
|
|
336.1 |
374.0 |
398.8 |
413.3 |
441.7 |
477.9 |
Stocks |
194.1 |
212.9 |
199.8 |
209.1 |
217.3 |
227.6 |
||
Debtors |
89.0 |
100.3 |
107.7 |
98.2 |
102.5 |
108.7 |
||
Cash |
27.9 |
41.1 |
77.9 |
92.7 |
108.6 |
128.3 |
||
Other |
25.1 |
19.6 |
13.3 |
13.3 |
13.3 |
13.3 |
||
Current Liabilities |
|
|
(214.8) |
(229.1) |
(220.7) |
(208.6) |
(216.5) |
(226.9) |
Creditors |
(129.2) |
(143.7) |
(129.3) |
(117.2) |
(125.1) |
(135.6) |
||
Short term borrowings |
(85.7) |
(85.4) |
(91.4) |
(91.4) |
(91.4) |
(91.4) |
||
Long Term Liabilities |
|
|
(82.8) |
(136.6) |
(157.3) |
(147.2) |
(131.7) |
(131.7) |
Long term borrowings |
(50.7) |
(93.9) |
(116.6) |
(116.6) |
(116.6) |
(116.6) |
||
Other long term liabilities |
(32.1) |
(42.6) |
(40.7) |
(30.5) |
(15.1) |
(15.1) |
||
Net Assets |
|
|
153.3 |
187.9 |
198.4 |
231.2 |
265.1 |
288.9 |
CASH FLOW |
||||||||
Operating Cash Flow |
|
|
23.3 |
53.7 |
54.6 |
33.3 |
35.6 |
41.9 |
Net Interest |
(4.7) |
(4.1) |
0.0 |
0.0 |
(3.0) |
(3.7) |
||
Tax |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Capex |
(9.1) |
(17.2) |
(8.4) |
(11.0) |
(10.5) |
(10.5) |
||
Acquisitions/disposals |
0.0 |
(64.8) |
(4.9) |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Financing |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Dividends |
(4.4) |
(6.3) |
(9.3) |
(7.5) |
(6.2) |
(7.9) |
||
Other |
2.8 |
8.6 |
(23.3) |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Net Cash Flow |
8.0 |
(30.2) |
8.7 |
14.7 |
15.9 |
19.8 |
||
Opening net debt/(cash) |
|
|
118.0 |
108.5 |
138.2 |
130.1 |
115.3 |
99.4 |
HP finance leases initiated |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
0.0 |
||
Other |
1.5 |
0.5 |
(0.6) |
0.0 |
(0.0) |
0.0 |
||
Closing net debt/(cash) |
|
|
108.5 |
138.2 |
130.1 |
115.3 |
99.4 |
79.7 |
Source: Edison Investment Research, Company data
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